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CASE COMMENT
WATERS AND WATER COURSESNON-TRIBUTARY GROUND WATER
In 1948, the district court of Mesa County entered its decree in
a general water adjudication proceeding and granted to the plaintiff decreed priorities for the use of water from an aquifer for
domestic purposes.' In 1957, the plaintiff instituted an action in the
lower court 2 to (1) obtain a mandatory injunction requiring the
state engineer and his deputies to recognize and enforce the 1948
decree, (2) to enjoin those defendants who had no decreed rights
from diverting water from the aquifer, and (3) to require the owners of all wells taking water from the aquifer to properly cement
and equip them to the end that water would not be wasted and lost.
The district court of Mesa County ordered the state engineer
and his deputies to control and administer the ground waters and
the well-the subject of this case-in the manner and to the same
purpose as in the case of diversions from public streams of the
State of Colorado." The defendants, on appeal, challenged the order
of the district court, contending (1) there was no legislative duty
on the defendants to control and administer such waters as ordered
by the district court; and (2) the waters involved, being non-tributary ground waters, were such that the doctrine of prior appropriation could not be applied. Held: (1) there is no legislative duty on
the defendants to control and administer the waters in question;
(2) the doctrine of prior appropriation does not apply to ground
water which is not tributary to a natural stream or river. Whitten v.
Coit, 385 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1963).
The question of what principles of law to apply to non-tributary ground water has never before arisen in Colorado. There are
two reasons for this: (1) in Colorado there is a well-established
presumption that all ground water is tributary to a natural stream
-the presumption is rebuttable, but the burden of proof is on the
party asserting the fact,4 (2) until recently it has been hydrologically impossible to determine with any real certainty that the water
in question is not tributary to a natural stream.
Colorado, until the present case, has determined the rights to
its waters by the doctrine of prior appropriation. In 1882, Judge
Helm, in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 5 said that the doctrine of
prior appropriation "has existed from the date of the earliest appropriation of water within the boundaries of this state." 6 He stated
further that the territorial legislature recognized and approved of
the appropriation doctrine in the legislation it passed in 1864.7 When
I District Court of Mesa County, Colorado, Civil Action No. 7327 (1948). This was one of the
first times the rights to well water was decided on the basis of the appropriation doctrine. It is
interesting to note that no appeal was taken contesting the court's decree.
2 District Court of Mesa County, Colorado, Civil Action No. 10599 (1957).
3 Surface waters are governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation, Colo. Rev. Stat. ff
147-1-1 to 147-17-16 (1953).
4 Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
6 Colo. 443 (1882).
6 Id. at 446.
7 Id. at 447.
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Colorado adopted its constitution in 1876, two sections were included dealing with water-s By court interpretation, these two sections have been held to mean that all water of a natural stream is
public property and that the doctrine of prior appropriation applies
in determining the rights to such water. 9
Colorado's only legislative attempts concerning ground water
regulation and control have been limited to two statutory enactments, 10 with numerous amendments. The acts are really in the
nature of conservation legislation; no provisions are made therein
for determining rights or priorities of ground water.
Presently in Colorado, the doctrine of prior appropriation applies to the waters of natural streams, ground waters that are tributary to a natural stream, and non-tributary surface waters. Because all ground water is presumed to be tributary to a natural
stream, it is subject to appropriation the same as are the waters of
a surface stream. 1 However, there are no separate statutes concerning the appropriation of ground waters. The present statutes that
may be suitable for fulfilling the needs in surface water appropriation are not suitable for ground water appropriation. 2
The court could have reached, in addition, either of two decisions that could be substantiated by established legal principles.
(1) The court could have decided that the doctrine of prior appropriation does apply to non-tributary ground water, or (2) could
have stated that this is a case dealing with tributary ground water
and that there was no need to determine whether non-tributary
ground water is subject to appropriation.
Based on history-both custom and legislative-the court could
have held that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the
doctrine of prior appropriation applies to non-tributary ground
water. Colorado, from the beginning, adopted the appropriation
13
doctrine and rejected the common law doctrine of riparian rights.
One exception to this statement has developed in the area of nontributary surface water. Such water is governed by the appropriation doctrine with the provision that the landowner on whose land
the water is located has a prior right if the water is capable of being used on his land. 1 4 It can be said that non-tributary ground
water is analogous to non-tributary surface water and, therefore,
the same exception should apply to it. However, it should be noted
that the exception in non-tributary surface water is a result of
legislation and not judicial decision. 15 The court could have followed the principle of appropriation, which is basic in determining
8 Colo. Const. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
9 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., supra note 5.
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 147-18-1 to 147-18-16 (1953); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 147-19-1 to 147-19-15
(Perm. Supp. 1960).
11 Cresson Consolidated Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 338 P.2d 278
(1959); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); DeHaas v. Benesch, 116
Colo. 344, 181 P.2d 453 (1947).
12 Colorado Water Conservation Board, Legal and Management Problems Related to the Development of an Artesian Ground Water Reservoir, Colorado Ground Water Circular No. 6 (1962).
13 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., supra note 5.
14 Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 90, § 20 (1935): "All ditches now constructed or hereafter to be constructed
tar the purpose of utilizing the waste, seepage or spring waters of the state shall be governed by
the same laws relating to priority of right as those ditches constructed for the purpose of utilizing
the water of running streams; provided, that the person upon whose land the seepage or spring
waters first arise, shall have the prior right to such waters if capable of being used upon his
lands, Lamas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279
Pac. 44 (1929).
15 Colorado's first legislation concerning non-tributary surface water was passed in 1889, L.'89,
p. 215, § 1.
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rights to water in dry states, and left it to the discretion of the
legislature to decide whether another exception to the appropriation doctrine is needed in Colorado.
If the court had wished to avoid making a decision as to what
law applies to non-tributary ground water, it could have decided
that the water involved was tributary ground water. Judge Hall,
in his dissent, states that it is unclear from the record what type
of water is involved in this case. The lower court found the water
was contained in a large aquifer, the walls of which were almost
impermeable, and that the water moved, if at all, very slowly.
However, even with this finding of fact, the presumption that exists
in Colorado today has not been met. 16 This presumption may be
rebutted, but the court has stated that such a presumption is strong,
and only clear and satisfactory evidence to the contrary is sufficient
to overcome it. 1 7 Both parties appear to have assumed that the
water in question was non-tributary. No evidence on this question
was presented in the trial court, nor was the issue ever raised on
appeal. It may be that none of the parties to the suit considered
the question of tributary or non-tributary ground water to be at
issue, since the rights to the water had been decided in 1948 on the
basis of the prior appropriation doctrine and the sole question in
this case was recognition and enforcement of that 1948 decree. Because no evidence was offered to establish the fact that the water
was non-tributary in nature, the presumption was not rebutted and
the supreme court did not need to decide whether the doctrine of
appropriation applies to non-tributary water.
One is led to feel that the court, in holding that non-tributary
ground water is not subject to appropriation, was trying to induce
the legislature into taking positive action on regulation, administration, and determination of rights to ground water-tributary or
non-tributary; however, it would have been helpful to the legislature if the court had held non-tributary ground water subject to
appropriation.'s Between the time of this decision and the time that
the legislature acts, some of the problems that will arise in determining rights to non-tributary ground water would have become
evident, and the legislature would have had guide lines upon which
to base their future legislation.
Another result of this holding will be to limit the use of nontributary ground water to the lowest economic user of wateragriculture. For example, industry, the highest economic user of
water, will not build and make use of such water unless it can be
assured of a continual supply. Under the principle expounded by
the court, no one can be assured the water he has today will be
there tomorrow and, therefore, will not be willing to make the
substantial investment necessary to make a higher economic use
of the water possible.'
John M. Pierce
16 "Under our Colorado law it is the presumption that all ground water so situated finds its
way to the stream in the watershed of which it lies, is tributary thereto, and subject to appropriation as part of the waters of the stream." Sofranek v. Town of Limon, supra note 4.
17 Safronek v. Town of Limon, supra note 4; Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 45 P.2d 176 (1935);
Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 225 Poc. 214 (1924).
IS This statement is based on the presumption that the Colorado legislature will adopt some
form of an appropriation system for determining rights to non-tributary ground water.
19 Wollman, Nathaniel, The Value of Water in Alternative Uses, University of New Mexico
Press (1962).

